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CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION OVER 
GROUNDWATER DISCHARGES AFTER COUNTY 
OF MAUI V. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND 
Jocelyn Lee* 
 
The Clean Water Act is the principal federal law aimed at controlling 
pollution of the nation’s water resources, yet it does not provide 
comprehensive oversight of pollutants entering groundwater, the subsurface 
water that often feeds into rivers, lakes, and oceans.  This Note examines a 
recent Supreme Court decision, County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 
which appeared to endorse a theory of federal regulation of groundwater 
discharges under the Clean Water Act.  County of Maui established a 
“functional equivalent” standard, under which a discharge through 
groundwater is subject to the Clean Water Act’s permitting requirements if 
it is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge into jurisdictional surface 
waters.  While the Court outlined several factors for courts to consider in 
making a functional equivalent determination, the decision offers limited 
guidance for lower courts applying the test.  Moreover, it leaves an important 
regulatory question unanswered.  This Note aims to address some of the 
persisting uncertainties by proposing that Justice Kennedy’s “significant 
nexus” standard from his Rapanos v. United States concurrence can be 
illuminating.  This Note argues that overlaying the significant nexus standard 
on the functional equivalent test offers a practical strategy for lower courts 
applying the test in difficult cases. 
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It is well established that surface waters—including rivers, lakes, and 
oceans—are often hydrologically connected to groundwater.1  Groundwater 
is the subsurface water that saturates pores or cracks in permeable geologic 
formations called aquifers2 and is replenished by precipitation.3  It has been 
shown to contribute 52 percent of annual streamflow across the country,4 and 
it serves as a major source of fresh water for agriculture and public supplies.5  
Consequently, groundwater contamination can have significant 
consequences for surface water quality and water supply.6 
 
 1. See THOMAS C. WINTER ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., CIRCULAR 1139, GROUND 
WATER AND SURFACE WATER:  A SINGLE RESOURCE 1 (1999), https://pubs.usgs.gov/circ 
/1998/1139/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TJZ7-8APM]; see also Brewster Conant Jr. et al., A 
Framework for Conceptualizing Groundwater-Surface Water Interactions and Identifying 
Potential Impacts on Water Quality, Water Quantity, and Ecosystems, 574 J. HYDROLOGY 
609, 609 (2019). 
 2. See Groundwater Basics, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://www.usgs.gov/mission-
areas/water-resources/science/groundwater-basics?qt-science_center_objects=0#qt-
science_center_objects [https://perma.cc/SG78-U5LP] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021). 
 3. See id. 
 4. See WINTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 12. 
 5. See Groundwater Use in the United States, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., 
https://www.usgs.gov/special-topic/water-science-school/science/groundwater-use-united-
states?qt-science_center_objects=0#qt-science_center_objects [https://perma.cc/B36W-
ESG4] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021). 
 6. See WINTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 1. 
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However, no federal statute—including the Clean Water Act7 (CWA), the 
principal federal law governing water pollution8—comprehensively 
regulates discharges to tributary groundwater.9  The CWA’s success at 
reducing releases of pollutants into surface waters over the last few decades10 
can be attributed in large part to § 301(a) of the Act.11  This provision 
essentially provides that all discharges from point sources—for example, 
pipes or wells—into “waters of the United States” are unlawful unless 
specifically authorized by permit.12  Permits contain technology-based 
limitations on the quantity and type of pollutants that can be released and—
paired with the statute’s citizen suit provision13 and civil, criminal, and 
administrative enforcement provisions—create an effective enforcement 
mechanism.14  The CWA’s implementing agencies, the EPA and U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”), have explicitly defined “waters of the 
United States” to exclude all groundwater.15  Nevertheless, a few theories for 
CWA regulation of discharges into tributary groundwater have found support 
in the courts, legal scholarship, and agency practice, including the “navigable 
waters theory” and the “conduit theory.”16 
On April 23, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a decision that 
appeared to agree with the conduit theory.  The 6-3 decision in County of 
Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund17 addressed the following question:  does 
§ 301(a) of the CWA cover discharges that travel from a point source through 
groundwater before being conveyed to surface waters?  The Court’s answer:  
sometimes.  The majority set forth a new “functional equivalent” test, which 
requires a discharger to obtain a CWA permit “if the addition of the pollutants 
through groundwater is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge from 
 
 7. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388. 
 8. CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30030, CLEAN WATER ACT:  A 
SUMMARY OF THE LAW 1 (2016). 
 9. See Michael C. Blumm & Steven M. Thiel, (Ground)waters of the United States:  
Unlawfully Excluding Tributary Groundwater from Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, 46 ENV’T 
L. 333, 334 (2016); Mary Christina Wood, Regulating Discharges into Groundwater:  The 
Crucial Link in Pollution Control Under the Clean Water Act, 12 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 569, 
570 (1988). 
 10. William L. Andreen, Success and Backlash:  The Remarkable (Continuing) Story of 
the Clean Water Act, 4 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENV’T L. 25, 28 (2013). 
 11. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). 
 12. See id. (prohibiting “the discharge of any pollutant by any person” unless authorized 
by permit).  The statute defines “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any pollutant to 
navigable waters from any point source.” Id. § 1362(12).  “Navigable waters” is defined as 
“the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” Id. § 1362(7). 
 13. The CWA contains a citizen suit provision, allowing concerned citizens to sue and 
enforce the Act’s protections against violators of the statute. Id. § 1365.  Citizen groups may 
not bring suit under this provision if a discharge falls outside the scope of CWA jurisdiction. 
 14. See COPELAND, supra note 8, at 3–7. 
 15. See Navigable Waters Protection Rule:  Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 
85 Fed. Reg. 22,250, 22,251 (Apr. 21, 2020) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 232, 300, 302, and 401); see also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(5) 
(2020); 40 C.F.R. § 122.2(2)(v) (2020). 
 16. See infra Part I.B. 
 17. 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020). 
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the point source into navigable waters.”18  The Court also supplied a list of 
seven “potentially relevant factors” for lower courts to consider when making 
such a determination.19 
The County of Maui decision represented a significant win for 
environmental interests, since a categorical “no” from the Court would have 
opened the door for polluting entities to avoid CWA enforcement by 
discharging into groundwater rather than surface waters.20  However, it was 
also met with criticism that the functional equivalent test provided inadequate 
guidance for lower courts, permitting agencies, and the regulated 
community.21  Further, the way that some practitioners have characterized 
the decision suggests a degree of ambiguity regarding whether the Court left 
the door open to a theory that “waters of the United States” includes 
groundwater.22 
Given the fact-specific nature of the functional equivalent standard and the 
underlying uncertainty about what the decision means for the “waters of the 
United States” debate, lower courts will play an important role in shaping the 
test.  The range of scenarios that are found to satisfy the test will have 
practical consequences for regulated entities seeking to understand when 
they should apply for a permit and what liability they might be subject to, as 
well as for citizen groups interested in bringing enforcement actions.23  At 
the same time, lower courts may need to adjust and respond as agency 
guidance on the relationship between groundwater and “waters of the United 
States” develops. 
Part I of this Note locates the County of Maui decision in a decades-long 
political story, marked more by uncertainty than certainty, concerning the 
scope of the CWA.  This story is essential to understanding the significance 
of the Court’s functional equivalent test and the questions the test raises about 
the Act’s relationship to groundwater and Congress’s legislative goals.  Part 
I also explains the regulatory context in which County of Maui was decided 
and examines the Court’s new standard for determining whether a permit is 
required where discharged pollutants travel through groundwater before 
reaching surface waters.  Part II illuminates the obvious and latent problems 
posed by the functional equivalent test and what these mean for stakeholders 
on the ground.  Finally, Part III suggests a “significant nexus” overlay 
framework for lower courts to understand and apply the County of Maui 
standard in difficult cases.  Part III argues that such an approach is both 
practical and protective of the nation’s water resources. 
 
 18. Id. at 1468. 
 19. See id. at 1476–77. 
 20. See Adam Liptak, Clean Water Act Covers Groundwater Discharges, Supreme Court 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/us/supreme-court-
clean-water-act-hawaii.html [https://perma.cc/K2BU-QHDV]. 
 21. See, e.g., County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1483 (Alito, J., dissenting); Ellen M. Gilmer 
& Amena H. Saiyid, SCOTUS Clean Water Act Test ‘Devastating’ for Industry, BLOOMBERG 
L. (Apr. 23, 2020, 5:13PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document 
/X3FE893G000000 [https://perma.cc/Y8QV-WFHM]. 
 22. See infra Part II.B. 
 23. See infra Part II.A. 
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I.  THE ROAD TO FEDERAL REGULATION OF GROUNDWATER DISCHARGES 
UNDER THE CWA 
Congress’s first comprehensive attempt to control water pollution was the 
passage of the 1948 Federal Water Pollution Control Act.24  After multiple 
amendments to the law during the 1950s and 1960s, the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 197225 finally established the basic 
structure of the CWA as it is known today.26  Part I.A provides an overview 
of the CWA and its two permitting programs.  Part I.B introduces two 
theories of CWA jurisdiction over groundwater discharges and dives into the 
related case law and regulatory history.  Finally, Part I.C explains the County 
of Maui decision. 
A.  The CWA 
The CWA’s objective is to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”27  To this end, § 301(a) of 
the Act sets forth a broad prohibition against “the discharge of any pollutant 
by any person” unless the discharge is specifically authorized by permit.28  
This statutory scheme aims to manage pollution to surface waters by 
requiring individual dischargers to obtain permits containing enforceable 
technology-based limitations.29  The CWA also states Congress’s intent to 
“recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of 
States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution” and to “plan the 
development and use . . . of land and water resources.”30 
The Act establishes two permitting programs that form the regulatory 
framework for federal water pollution control.  Section 402 of the CWA 
authorizes the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
 
 24. Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–
1388); see also William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation:  The Congressional 
Prescription for Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 202, 210 (1987). 
 25. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 26. See Andreen, supra note 24, at 212–16. 
 27. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).  The U.S. House of Representatives’ report on the CWA stated 
that “[t]he word ‘integrity’ . . . refers to a condition in which the natural structure and function 
of ecosystems [are] maintained.” H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 76 (1972). 
 28. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); see also COPELAND, supra note 8, at 5. 
 29. See William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United 
States—State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789–1972 (pt.2), 22 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 215, 286 
(2003); Vanessa Ramirez, An Attempt at Clearing the Muddied Waters of the United States, 
34 J. ENV’T L. & LITIG. 161, 164 (2019). 
 30. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).  This cooperative federalism framework has been described as 
one where “federal and state governments work together in structured, overlapping, and 
synergistic ways to achieve . . . improved water quality nationwide.” Robin Kundis Craig, 
Adapting Water Federalism to Climate Change Impacts:  Energy Policy, Food Security, and 
the Allocation of Water Resources, 5 ENV’T & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 183, 202 (2010).  
However, it has also been characterized as a federal-state partnership that is “heavily federal.” 
Oliver A. Houck, Cooperative Federalism, Nutrients, and the Clean Water Act:  Three Cases 
Revisited, 44 ENV’T L. REP. 10,426, 10,426 (2014). 
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permit program,31 which serves as the Act’s main enforcement mechanism32 
and applies to discharges of most “pollutants” into jurisdictional waters.33  
NPDES permits are administered by the EPA34 and contain limitations on 
the quantity of pollutants that can be discharged, as well as water monitoring 
and reporting requirements.35  Under § 404 of the CWA, the Corps 
administers a second permit program36 specifically for discharges of dredged 
or fill material37 to jurisdictional waters, including wetlands.38  Activities 
subject to § 404 permitting typically include filling wetlands for 
development, infrastructure and water resource projects, and mining 
projects.39 
The scope of federal regulatory authority under the NPDES and § 404 
programs lies in the meaning of “discharge of a pollutant,” which the CWA 
defines as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point 
source.”40  This language suggests that not all pollutant discharges are 
subject to the Act’s permitting requirements.41  First, the discharge must 
enter “navigable waters,” which are defined as “the waters of the United 
States, including the territorial seas,” a phrase that is not further explained in 
the statute.42  Second, covered discharges must come from a “point source,” 
defined as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance . . . from 
 
 31. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342. 
 32. See COPELAND, supra note 8, at 6. 
 33. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a).  The CWA defines “pollutant” broadly to include dredged 
spoil, solid waste, chemical wastes, biological materials, heat, rock, sand, and other materials 
discharged into water. Id. § 1362(6). 
 34. See id. § 1342(a).  While this Note describes NPDES permitting as carried out by the 
EPA, the CWA allows the EPA to authorize states to administer the program. Id. § 1342(b).  
All but a few states have received authorization. See NPDES State Program Authority, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-state-program-authority [https://perma.cc/R9NW-PNCB] 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2021). 
 35. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a); see also NPDES Permit Basics, EPA, https://www.epa.gov 
/npdes/npdes-permit-basics [https://perma.cc/3RH5-KGDN] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021). 
 36. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (d).  The CWA also allows for states to administer the § 404 
program upon EPA authorization. Id. § 1344(g)–1344(h).  However, only three states are 
authorized. U.S. Interactive Map of State and Tribal Assumption Under CWA Section 404, 
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/cwa404g/us-interactive-map-state-and-tribal-assumption-under-
cwa-section-404 [https://perma.cc/H3NF-BEFR] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021). 
 37. Dredged material includes material that is excavated or dredged from jurisdictional 
waters. 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2020).  Fill material includes material placed in jurisdictional 
waters that has the effect of replacing some portion of the water with dry land or changing the 
bottom elevation of the jurisdictional water. Id. 
 38. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a); Permit Program Under CWA Section 404, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/permit-program-under-cwa-section-404 [https://perma.cc/ 
CTS7-GBKN] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021).  Wetlands are generally characterized as areas 
where water covers the land or is present at or near the surface of the soil for at least some 
periods of time during the year, such that conditions support the growth of aquatic plants. 
What Is a Wetland?, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/wetlands/what-wetland [https://perma.cc 
/H3ND-6JPC] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021). 
 39. Permit Program Under CWA Section 404, supra note 38. 
 40. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).  For the statutory definition of “pollutant,” see supra note 33. 
 41. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:  LAW, SCIENCE AND 
POLICY 697 (8th ed. 2018). 
 42. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). 
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which pollutants are or may be discharged,” such as a “pipe, ditch, 
channel . . . [or] well.”43 
B.  Theories of CWA Jurisdiction over Groundwater Discharges 
Among the theories of CWA jurisdiction over discharges to groundwater 
that have arisen under these statutory requirements,44 two are most relevant 
to the discussion of County of Maui.45  The first, the navigable waters theory, 
posits that groundwater can be considered “navigable waters” under the Act 
in certain circumstances.46  This theory runs counter to the EPA and the 
Corps’s definition of “waters of the United States,” which categorically 
excludes groundwater.47  The second, the conduit theory, suggests that 
groundwater can operate as a conduit that carries pollution from a point 
source to jurisdictional surface waters.48 
1.  The Navigable Waters Theory 
There has long been a general understanding that “waters of the United 
States”—the phrase the CWA uses to define “navigable waters”—
encompasses more than just navigable-in-fact waters.49  Courts and the 
federal agencies have at various points considered wetlands, nonnavigable 
tributaries, and other nonnavigable waters to be “waters of the United 
States.”50  The navigable waters theory uses this broad definition as a basis 
 
 43. Id. § 1362(14). 
 44. See Damien Schiff, Keeping the Clean Water Act Cooperatively Federal—or, Why the 
Clean Water Act Does Not Directly Regulate Groundwater Pollution, 42 WM. & MARY ENV’T 
L. & POL’Y REV. 447, 460 (2018); Kathrine Klaus, Note, The Conduit Theory:  Protecting 
Navigable Waters from Discharges to Tributary Groundwater, 43 VT. L. REV. 871, 878 
(2019). 
 45. A third theory, the point source theory, proposes that groundwater is a “point source” 
of pollution.  The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky held in favor of the 
point source theory. See Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Utils. Co., 303 F. Supp. 3d 530, 542 (E.D. 
Ky. 2017).  However, the Sixth Circuit rejected the point source theory when it partially 
affirmed the district court’s ruling. See Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Utils. Co., 905 F.3d 925, 
933, 938 (6th Cir. 2018), abrogated by County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 
1462 (2020). 
 46. See generally Blumm & Thiel, supra note 9; Wood, supra note 9. 
 47. See Navigable Waters Protection Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250 (Apr. 21, 2020) (to be 
codified at 33 C.F.R pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 232, 300, 302, 
and 401); see also supra text accompanying note 15. 
 48. See, e.g., Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, 887 F.3d 637, 651–52 
(4th Cir. 2018), vacated, 140 S. Ct. 2736 (2020), abrogated by County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. 
1462; Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated, 140 
S. Ct. 1462; see also Schiff, supra note 44; Klaus, supra note 44. 
 49. See William W. Sapp et al., From the Fields of Runnymede to the Waters of the United 
States:  A Historical Review of the Clean Water Act and the Term “Navigable Waters,” 36 
ENV’T L. REP. 10,190, 10,191 (2006). 
 50. See, e.g., United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1330 (6th Cir. 
1974) (holding that CWA jurisdiction extended to nonnavigable tributaries); United States v. 
Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 673 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (holding that CWA jurisdiction extended to 
nonnavigable mangrove wetlands); Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,058 (June 29, 
2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 44 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 300, 302, 
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for proposing that groundwater can also be classified as a jurisdictional 
water.51 
However, the extent to which nonnavigable waters, including 
groundwater, constitute “waters of the United States” is murky and has been 
the subject of intense debate in the courts, federal agencies, and legal 
scholarship since the 1980s.52  Where the line is drawn has significant 
consequences, because the vast majority of the nation’s waters are neither 
navigable-in-fact waters nor wetlands adjoining navigable-in-fact waters.53 
Although the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the relationship 
between groundwater and “waters of the United States,” it has attempted to 
clarify the bounds of “waters of the United States” on three separate 
occasions.54  These cases were confined to questions about what types of 
wetlands should be regulated as “waters of the United States,” but the Court’s 
analyses are relevant to groundwater because the same statutory language 
and congressional intent are discussed.55  In United States v. Riverside 
Bayview,56 a unanimous Court found that Congress intended to define 
jurisdictional waters broadly and agreed with the Corps’s interpretation that 
wetlands abutting navigable waters fell within the meaning of “waters of the 
United States.”57  Notably, the Court based its decision in part on ecological 
considerations, stating that pollution to adjacent wetlands would impact the 
water quality of the larger “aquatic system.”58  Then, in Solid Waste Agency 
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,59 the Court rejected the Corps’s position 
that isolated ponds used as habitats by migratory birds were covered by the 
CWA.60  The Court clarified that its Riverside Bayview holding was based 
on the “significant nexus” between the adjacent wetlands and navigable 
waters.61  Because the ponds in Solid Waste Agency did not abut navigable 
waters, a “significant nexus” was lacking, and the CWA could not be read to 
apply to the ponds.62 
Finally, in Rapanos v. United States63 the Supreme Court split 4-1-4 on 
the question of whether “waters of the United States” includes a wetland that 
at least occasionally empties into a tributary of a navigable-in-fact water.64  
 
and 401) (defining “waters of the United States” to include tributaries, wetlands adjacent to 
navigable waters, and other nonnavigable waters). 
 51. See Wood, supra note 9, at 586. 
 52. See Sapp et al., supra note 49, at 10,212–13.  See generally Ramirez, supra note 29. 
 53. See Sapp et al., supra note 49, at 10,190. 
 54. See generally Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 
Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
 55. Blumm & Thiel, supra note 9, at 351. 
 56. 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
 57. Id. at 133–34. 
 58. Id. at 134. 
 59. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 60. See id. at 167. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
 64. See id. at 729. 
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Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia defined “waters 
of the United States” as including only “relatively permanent, standing or 
continuously flowing bodies of water.”65  He reasoned that the word 
“navigable” should not be entirely read out of the statute; its inclusion at least 
requires that “waters of the United States” contain “the ordinary presence of 
water.”66  Justice Scalia then concluded that the determinative factor should 
be whether a wetland has a “continuous surface connection” to adjacent 
navigable waters such that “there is no clear demarcation between ‘waters’ 
and wetlands.”67  He limited the significance of the Riverside Bayview 
majority’s reliance on ecological factors, stating that such considerations 
may only be invoked when the case presents a boundary-drawing problem.68  
Of primary concern for Justice Scalia was that allowing the Corps to require 
permits for filling wetlands with only an intermittent connection to 
traditionally navigable waters would impinge on the states’ traditional 
powers over land and water use.69  He wrote, “We ordinarily expect a ‘clear 
and manifest’ statement from Congress to authorize an unprecedented 
intrusion into traditional state authority.  The phrase ‘the waters of the United 
States’ hardly qualifies.”70 
Meanwhile, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurrence articulated a much 
broader “significant nexus” test, under which CWA jurisdiction attaches on 
a case-by-case basis if wetlands “either alone or in combination with 
similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity” of traditionally navigable waters.71  If the 
effects of wetlands on downstream water quality are instead “speculative or 
insubstantial,” they cannot be considered “waters of the United States.”72  
Something more than the mere existence of a hydrologic connection is 
required,73 and Justice Kennedy indicated that quantity and regularity of 
water flow in the tributaries connecting a wetland to navigable waters may 
be an important part of the significant nexus analysis.74  Further, Justice 
Kennedy stated that the significant nexus determination should be made with 
regard to Congress’s goal of “restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical, 
 
 65. Id. at 739. 
 66. See id. at 734 (“As we noted in [Solid Waste Agency], the traditional term ‘navigable 
waters’ . . . carries some of its original substance:  ‘[I]t is one thing to give a word limited 
effect and quite another to give it no effect whatever.’  That limited effect includes, at bare 
minimum, the ordinary presence of water.” (quoting Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001))). 
 67. Id. at 742. 
 68. See id. (“Wetlands with only an intermittent, physically remote hydrologic connection 
to ‘waters of the United States’ do not implicate the boundary-drawing problem of Riverside 
Bayview . . . .”). 
 69. See id. at 738. 
 70. Id. (citation omitted) (first quoting BFP v. Resol. Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994); 
and then quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)). 
 71. Id. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. at 784. 
 74. See id. at 786. 
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physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”75  While he 
recognized that his standard does not fit neatly within the traditional zone of 
federal authority, he observed it “does not raise federalism . . . concerns 
sufficient to support a presumption against its adoption.”76  Justice Kennedy 
criticized the plurality’s standard as inconsistent with the text, structure, and 
purpose of the CWA.77  He argued that requiring permanent or continuously 
flowing water is impractical, given the Act’s concern with downstream water 
quality78 and that requiring a surface water connection finds no support in 
the structure of the Act.79 
In the wake of Rapanos, there was significant uncertainty in the courts and 
debate in legal scholarship about which opinion controlled.80  Many courts 
have said that Justice Kennedy’s test controls,81 citing the Supreme Court’s 
guidance in Marks v. United States.82  However, other courts have held that 
either Justice Kennedy’s or Justice Scalia’s test can be used to find CWA 
jurisdiction over waters.83  The EPA and the Corps took the former approach, 
publishing the highly controversial Clean Water Rule:  Definition of “Waters 
of the United States” (“the Clean Water Rule”) in 2015.84  The Clean Water 
Rule adopted Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test85 by establishing three 
 
 75. Id. at 779 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)). 
 76. Id. at 782. 
 77. Id. at 776. 
 78. Id. at 769 (“The merest trickle, if continuous, would count as a ‘water’ subject to 
federal regulation, while torrents thundering at irregular intervals through otherwise dry 
channels would not.  Though the plurality seems to presume that such irregular flows are too 
insignificant to be of concern in a statute focused on ‘waters,’ that may not always be true.”). 
 79. Id. at 774. 
 80. See generally PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 41, at 692; James Murphy, Muddying the 
Waters of the Clean Water Act:  Rapanos v. United States and the Future of America’s Water 
Resources, 31 VT. L. REV. 355, 357 (2007). 
 81. See United States v. Robinson, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221–22 (11th Cir. 2007); N. Cal. 
River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gerke 
Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724–25 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 82. 430 U.S. 188 (1977); id. at 193 (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no 
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the 
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments 
on the narrowest grounds . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 169 n.15 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.))). 
 83. See United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 209–10 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 60 (1st 
Cir. 2006). 
 84. See Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 
328 and 44 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 300, 302, and 401).  The agencies 
received over one million public comments on the proposed version. Id. at 37,057.  The final 
rule was challenged by a majority of states. Timothy Cama, 27 States Challenge Obama Water 
Rule in Court, HILL (June 30, 2015, 12:02 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-
environment/246539-27-states-challenge-obama-water-rule-in-court [https://perma.cc/CGT4 
-C623].  Congress also attempted to overturn the final rule, but President Barack Obama 
vetoed the resolution. Timothy Cama, Obama Vetoes GOP Attempt to Block Water Rule, HILL 
(Jan. 19, 2016, 7:22 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/266395-obama-
vetoes-gop-attempt-to-block-water-rule [https://perma.cc/GP9B-S8QH]. 
 85. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,056 (“An important element of the agencies’ 
interpretation of the CWA is the significant nexus standard [developed in Riverside Bayview 
and Solid Waste Agency] and refined in Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Rapanos.”). 
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categories of waters:  jurisdictional by rule, nonjurisdictional, and case-
specific waters that turn on a finding of a significant nexus.86  Yet, the Clean 
Water Rule placed groundwater in the nonjurisdictional category—meaning 
that, regardless of any connection to surface waters, groundwater never 
constitutes “waters of the United States.”87 
The Clean Water Rule was short-lived, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit issued a nationwide stay on the rule just two months after it 
became effective,88 and in early 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued an 
executive order sending the rule back to the agencies for further review.89  In 
the order, President Trump directed the agencies to “consider interpreting the 
term ‘navigable waters,’ . . . in a manner consistent with” Justice Scalia’s 
plurality opinion in Rapanos.90  On April 21, 2020, just two days before the 
Supreme Court handed down its County of Maui decision, the EPA and the 
Corps released the rule’s replacement, the Navigable Waters Protection Rule:  
Definition of “Waters of the United States”91 (“the WOTUS Rule”).  Like 
the one it replaced, this rule provided that groundwater was categorically 
excluded from the definition of “waters of the United States.”92 
In contrast to the agencies’ stance, advocates of the navigable waters 
theory have argued that Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test requires 
direct federal regulation of at least some groundwater as “waters of the 
United States.”93  These advocates emphasize the science, which supports 
the critical importance of groundwater for the health of other water bodies, 
humans, and the economy.94  They argue that the CWA’s goal of “restor[ing] 
and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
 
 86. Id. at 37,057.  “Paragraph (c)(5) of the rule defines the term ‘significant nexus’ to 
mean a significant effect (more than speculative or insubstantial) on the chemical, physical, 
or biological integrity of a traditional navigable water, interstate water, or the territorial seas.” 
Id. at 37,091. 
 87. Id. at 37,059. 
 88. Ohio v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (In re Env’t Prot. Agency & Dep’t of Def. Final 
Rule), 803 F.3d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 89. Exec. Order No. 13,778, 3 C.F.R. 296 (2018). 
 90. Id. at 297. 
 91. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250 (Apr. 21, 2020) (to be codified 
at 33 C.F.R pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 232, 300, 302, and 401).  
This rule was part of a broader effort by the Trump administration to scale back regulation 
under the CWA and other federal environmental laws. Nadja Popovich et al., The Trump 
Administration Is Reversing More than 100 Environmental Rules.  Here’s the Full List, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/climate/trump-
environment-rollbacks-list.html [https://perma.cc/Y45C-ERF2]. 
 92. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 22,250. 
 93. See Blumm & Thiel, supra note 9, at 337. 
 94. See id.; Wood, supra note 9, at 569–70.  In 2014, the EPA’s Science Advisory Board 
issued a letter approving of most of the proposed Clean Water Rule, including the rule’s 
application of the significant nexus test to certain waters but rejecting the decision to 
categorically exclude groundwater.  The letter explained that groundwater “can be critical in 
supporting the hydrology and biogeochemical functions of wetlands and other waters,” and 
therefore the rule’s exclusion did not have scientific justification. See Letter from Dr. David 
T. Allen, Chair, U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency Sci. Advisory Bd., to Gina McCarthy, Adm’r, U.S. 
Env’t Prot. Agency (Sept. 30, 2014), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey 
=P100RO1P.TXT [https://perma.cc/GCE4-UHQB]. 
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Nation’s waters”95 cannot be accomplished without federal regulation of 
groundwater that shares a significant nexus with surface waters.96  Further, 
these advocates assert that a significant body of case law, including the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Riverside Bayview, supports an expansive 
interpretation of CWA jurisdiction that includes some groundwater.97 
One critic of the navigable waters theory points to the fact that the CWA 
only provides for direct federal regulation of “navigable waters,” despite 
distinguishing between “navigable waters” and “ground waters” in multiple 
places.98  Critics also argue that the CWA’s legislative history precludes any 
reading of “navigable waters” that includes groundwater because committees 
in both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives acknowledged the 
importance of groundwater yet chose not to establish federal groundwater 
standards.99  Moreover, Representative Les Aspin proposed an amendment 
on the House floor that would have explicitly prohibited any unpermitted 
discharges to groundwater, but it was voted down.100 
Additionally, opponents of federal regulation of groundwater argue that 
expanding the CWA in this way would have dire policy implications.101  
Certain federal statutes, including the Safe Drinking Water Act102 (SDWA), 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976103 (RCRA), and the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
of 1980104 regulate specific activities affecting groundwater.  Many states 
have passed laws that regulate discharges to groundwater to varying 
extents.105  Those who urge leaving groundwater regulation to these federal 
statutes and the states warn that applying CWA permitting requirements to 
groundwater would lead to duplicative permitting and overburdened 
agencies.106  Applying the CWA to groundwater would also “disincentivize 
the implementation of voluntary conservation practices” in agriculture, 
 
 95. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
 96. See Blumm & Thiel, supra note 9, at 378 (“To fulfill the purpose of the CWA, the 
agencies must protect the quality of the nation’s waters by including groundwater among those 
waters whose jurisdiction is dependent upon a case-specific analysis of their nexus to other 
jurisdictional waters.”). 
 97. Id. at 366–67. 
 98. See Schiff, supra note 44, at 449–50. 
 99. See id. at 462; see also Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 
F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming the district court’s holding that groundwater is never 
among the “waters of the United States” in part because congressional proposals to add 
groundwater to the scope of the CWA were defeated). 
 100. See Schiff, supra note 44, at 462. 
 101. See Scott Yager & Mary-Thomas Hart, The Tipping Point Source:  Clean Water Act 
Regulation of Discharges to Surface Water via Groundwater, and Specific Implications for 
Nonpoint Source Agriculture, 23 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 439, 467–68 (2018). 
 102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-27. 
 103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6987. 
 104. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 
33, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 105. See THOMSON REUTERS, 50 STATE REGULATORY SURVEYS:  ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS:  
POLLUTION:  PERMITS FOR GROUNDWATER AND SURFACE WATER DISCHARGE, 0070 
REGSURVEYS 13 (Apr. 2020). 
 106. See Yager & Hart, supra note 101, at 467–68. 
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“[b]lur[] the line between point and nonpoint source regulation,” and 
“cripple” regulated entities.107 
However, proponents of the navigable waters theory contend that those 
other federal and state statutory schemes do not offer comprehensive or 
uniform protections for groundwater.108  They argue the CWA’s legislative 
history is inconclusive on the question of whether federal authority extends 
to some groundwater.109  Representative Aspin’s amendment called for 
federal regulation of all groundwater under NPDES and the elimination of an 
exemption from the “pollutant” definition for materials injected into wells 
during oil and gas production.110  It has been argued that Congress rejected 
the amendment because of this exemption and because Congress may have 
assumed the statute’s definition of “navigable waters” already encompassed 
groundwater, rendering the amendment unnecessary.111 
2.  The Conduit Theory 
The conduit theory, which posits that certain groundwater discharges are 
subject to CWA regulation because groundwater can serve as a conduit 
between point sources and jurisdictional surface waters, has had more 
success.  For decades, the EPA regularly applied NPDES permitting 
requirements to point source discharges that first travel through groundwater 
before reaching surface waters.112  Additionally, many courts endorsed 
versions of the conduit theory.113  For instance, in Upstate Forever v. Kinder 
Morgan Energy Partners,114 the Fourth Circuit held that the CWA would 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Blumm & Thiel, supra note 9, at 338 (“At the state level, regulation varies wildly 
among jurisdictions.  These inconsistent protections fail to prevent groundwater 
contamination in an interconnected hydrologic system.”); Wood, supra note 9, at 570 
(“Though several federal pollution statutes are aimed in part at groundwater protection, much 
groundwater falls outside the federal regulatory net.”). 
 109. See Blumm & Thiel, supra note 9, at 375–76; Philip M. Quatrochi, Comment, 
Groundwater Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act:  The Tributary Groundwater Dilemma, 
23 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 603, 617–18 (1996). 
 110. Quatrochi, supra note 109, at 617. 
 111. Id. at 617–18. 
 112. See County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1472 (2020); Brief for 
the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 22, Haw. Wildlife 
Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-17447).  Note the distinction 
between:  (1) the EPA regulating discharges that first travel through groundwater before 
reaching jurisdictional surface waters, and (2) the EPA regulating discharges into groundwater 
because the groundwater is itself a jurisdictional water (what the EPA refused to do under the 
Clean Water Rule and WOTUS Rule). 
 113. See, e.g., Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, 887 F.3d 637, 651–52 
(4th Cir. 2018), vacated, 140 S. Ct. 2736 (2020), and abrogated by County of Maui, 140 S. 
Ct. 1462; County of Maui, 886 F.3d at 749, vacated, 140 S. Ct. 1462; N. Cal. River Watch v. 
Mercer Fraser Co., No. C–04–4620, 2005 WL 2122052, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2005); Idaho 
Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1179–80 (D. Idaho 2001). 
 114. 887 F.3d 637 (4th Cir. 2018).  Plaintiffs brought a citizen suit against the owner of an 
underground gasoline pipeline in South Carolina that ruptured. Id. at 641.  They alleged that 
the released pollutants were seeping from groundwater into nearby tributaries of the Savannah 
River and their adjacent wetlands. Id. at 643. 
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apply to groundwater discharges from a pipeline where there is a “direct 
hydrological connection” to creeks and adjacent wetlands.115  It emphasized 
that holding the contrary would undermine the Act’s purpose and its strict 
liability regime.116  Notably, it explicitly stated that it was not addressing 
whether groundwater itself can be considered “navigable waters” under the 
CWA.117  The Ninth Circuit embraced a slightly narrower conduit theory in 
Hawaii Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui.118  It held that an NPDES permit 
was required for groundwater discharges from underground injection wells 
where the discharged pollutants were “fairly traceable” to the ocean.119  In 
its decision, the Ninth Circuit cited to other circuit court decisions applying 
standards analogous to the conduit theory.120  Like the Upstate Forever court, 
it made clear that it was not deciding whether groundwater is itself 
jurisdictional under the CWA.121 
Arguments against the conduit theory often stem from federalism 
concerns.122  In establishing the CWA’s cooperative federalism framework, 
the argument goes, Congress sought to avoid intruding on areas of land and 
water use regulation traditionally left to the states.123  Consequently, 
Congress placed great emphasis on the role of states in administering and 
enforcing the statute, particularly in the realm of non–point source 
pollution.124  Any federal regulation of discharges to groundwater would 
“compromise this statutory division of labor.”125  In Kentucky Waterways 
Alliance v. Kentucky Utilities Co.,126 the Sixth Circuit rejected the conduit 
theory advanced by the plaintiffs, holding that the CWA did not cover 
pollutants traveling from coal ash ponds through groundwater to a nearby 
lake.127  It found that the conduit theory was not compatible with the text of 
 
 115. See id. at 651–52.  After setting forth a “direct hydrological connection” standard, the 
court remanded the case for further consideration by the district court. Id. at 653. 
 116. Id. at 648, 652. 
 117. Id. at 646 n.5 (“Had the plaintiffs alleged that ground water, of itself, falls within the 
meaning of navigable waters under the CWA, we would be confronting a distinctly different 
question here.”). 
 118. 886 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated, 140 S. Ct. 1462.  For the facts of the case, see 
infra Part I.C. 
 119. Id. at 749. 
 120. See id. at 747–48 (first citing Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview 
Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994); and then citing League of Wilderness Defs./Blue Mountains 
Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 121. Id. at 748 (“[W]e do not decide whether groundwater is a ‘navigable water’ under the 
statute.”). 
 122. See Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Utils. Co., 905 F.3d 925, 936–37 (6th Cir. 2018), 
abrogated by County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. 1462; Schiff, supra note 44, at 468.  Such arguments 
also apply to the other theories of CWA regulation of groundwater discharges. 
 123. See Schiff, supra note 44, at 449. 
 124. See Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 936–37; Schiff, supra note 44, at 456–57. 
 125. Schiff, supra note 44, at 449. 
 126. 905 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2018).  Plaintiff environmental groups brought a citizen suit 
against a coal-fired power plant owner, asserting that the chemicals in the plant’s coal ash 
ponds were contaminating a nearby lake via groundwater. Id. at 928, 930–31. 
 127. Id. at 932–33. 
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the Act128 nor with the CWA’s purpose of preserving significant state 
involvement in water pollution regulation.129 
In 2019, the EPA changed its long-standing practice of regulating 
discharges that are conveyed through groundwater to jurisdictional surface 
waters.130  The agency issued an interpretive statement, concluding that the 
CWA is best read as excluding all discharges from point sources into 
groundwater from NPDES permitting, even when pollutants would 
ultimately reach navigable waters.131  The action represented a wholesale 
refusal of any theory of groundwater regulation under the Act.  However, just 
over a year later, the Supreme Court rejected the EPA’s position in County 
of Maui.132 
C.  County of Maui:  A “Functional Equivalent” Standard 
The issue before the Court in County of Maui was whether § 301(a) of the 
CWA covers discharges that travel from a point source to groundwater before 
finally being conveyed to a navigable water.133  Since the 1980s, the County 
of Maui has operated a wastewater treatment facility134 that pumps up to four 
million gallons daily of treated sewage water into underground wells.135  The 
effluent136 then travels about a half mile through groundwater until it reaches 
the ocean.137  In 2012, environmental groups filed a CWA citizen suit against 
the county for discharging pollutants into navigable waters—the Pacific 
Ocean—without an NPDES permit.138  The plaintiffs alleged that the 
facility’s wastewater discharges had harmed the area’s fragile ecosystem, 
citing a letter from the Hawaiʻi Department of Land and Natural Resources 
to the EPA that linked the discharges to coral reef degradation and invasive 
algal blooms just offshore of the facility.139 
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the 
environmental groups, although they took slightly different approaches.140  
The district court held that the discharge was “functionally one into navigable 
water.”141  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the pollutants are “fairly 
 
 128. Id. at 934 (interpreting “into navigable waters” as requiring directness). 
 129. Id. at 937. 
 130. See Interpretive Statement on Application of the Clean Water Act National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System Program to Releases of Pollutants from a Point Source to 
Groundwater, 84 Fed. Reg. 16,810 (Apr. 23, 2019) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122). 
 131. See id. at 16,811. 
 132. See infra notes 172–73 and accompanying text. 
 133. County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1468 (2020). 
 134. Brief for Petitioner at 6, County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (No. 18-260). 
 135. County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1469. 
 136. In this context, effluent refers to “waste material . . . discharged into the environment.” 
See Effluent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com 
/dictionary/effluent [https://perma.cc/A777-VTRC] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021). 
 137. County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1469. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 20, Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County 
of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980 (D. Haw. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 12–00198). 
 140. See County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1469. 
 141. County of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 998. 
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traceable” from the point source to a navigable water, the discharge requires 
an NPDES permit.142  Other circuit courts described the statutory standard 
differently,143 creating a split. 
Consistent with its practice, at the time, of regulating discharges that 
traveled through groundwater before reaching navigable waters,144 the EPA 
supported the plaintiffs County of Maui in the Ninth Circuit.145  However, 
the EPA reversed course shortly before the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in 2019.146  Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a brief with 
the Supreme Court supporting the County of Maui.147  The county argued 
that an NPDES permit is required only where pollutants are delivered from a 
point source directly into navigable waters.148 
In its interpretation of § 301(a)’s “from any point source” language,149 the 
Court declined to apply the Ninth Circuit’s test and the county’s proposed 
standard, instead taking a middle ground approach.150  Justice Breyer, writing 
for the majority, articulated a new “functional equivalent” test, whereby a 
permit is required “if the addition of the pollutants through groundwater is 
the functional equivalent of a direct discharge from the point source into 
navigable waters.”151  He enumerated several potentially relevant factors to 
consider when making such a determination, including: 
(1) transit time, (2) distance traveled, (3) the nature of the material through 
which the pollutant travels, (4) the extent to which the pollutant is diluted 
or chemically changed as it travels, (5) the amount of pollutant entering the 
navigable waters relative to the amount of the pollutant that leaves the point 
source, (6) the manner by or area in which the pollutant enters the navigable 
waters, (7) the degree to which the pollution (at that point) has maintained 
its specific identity.152 
Time and distance will usually be the most important factors.153 
 
 142. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated, 
140 S. Ct. 1462; see also supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 143. See Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, 887 F.3d 637, 651–52 (4th 
Cir. 2018), vacated, 140 S. Ct. 2736 (2020), abrogated by County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. 1462; 
Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Utils. Co., 905 F.3d 925, 933 (6th Cir. 2018), abrogated by County 
of Maui, 140 S. Ct. 1462; see also supra Part I.B.2. 
 144. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
 145. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-
Appellees, supra note 112. 
 146. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. 
 147. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (No. 18-260).  Notably, the U.S. Department of Justice did 
not ask the Court to give Chevron deference to the EPA’s interpretation of the CWA. See 
County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1474.  A discussion of Chevron deference is beyond the scope 
of this Note. 
 148. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 134, at 25. 
 149. See County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1470. 
 150. See id.  The Court’s test is arguably relatively similar to the Ninth Circuit’s test, but 
Justice Breyer indicated that the majority’s standard is intended to be narrower. Id. 
 151. Id. at 1468. 
 152. Id. at 1476–77. 
 153. Id. at 1477. 
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In an attempt to add some shape to this highly fact-sensitive standard, 
Justice Breyer added that the permitting requirement clearly applies where a 
pipe emitting pollutants ends a few feet from navigable waters and those 
pollutants travel through groundwater to reach the navigable waters.154  On 
the other hand, if a pipe releases pollutants fifty miles and “many years” away 
from a navigable water, a permit is likely not required.155  Acknowledging 
that its functional equivalent test would be difficult to apply,156 the majority 
suggested that lower courts can help refine the test through individual cases 
and the EPA can provide administrative guidance by granting individual 
permits, promulgating general permits,157 and developing general rules.158  
Justice Breyer also indicated that the CWA’s underlying objectives should 
guide determinations, stating that “decisions should not create serious risks 
either of undermining state regulation of groundwater or of creating 
loopholes that undermine the statute’s basic federal regulatory objectives.”159  
While the decision was made in the NPDES permitting context, the majority 
opinion did not specify whether the functional equivalent standard ever 
applies to discharges of fill or dredged material that come under the § 404 
permit program.160 
Justice Breyer rejected the Ninth Circuit’s “fairly traceable” test, because 
he was concerned that it would allow for federal regulation of discharges that 
only reach surface waters “in highly diluted forms” and “many years after 
their release.”161  He opined that Congress did not intend for the federal 
agencies to hold this kind of general groundwater regulatory authority, citing 
Congress’s intent to “leave substantial responsibility and autonomy to the 
States” in the realm of groundwater and non-point-source-pollution 
regulation.162  However, he also feared risking “interference with the EPA’s 
ability to regulate ordinary point source discharges.”163  Justice Breyer noted, 
“EPA correctly points out that Congress did not require a permit for all 
discharges to groundwater . . . .  But there is quite a gap between ‘not all’ and 
‘none.’”164  Justice Breyer did not explicitly address whether groundwater 
 
 154. See id. at 1476. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. (“The difficulty with this approach, we recognize, is that it does not, on its 
own, clearly explain how to deal with middle instances.  But there are too many potentially 
relevant factors applicable to factually different cases for this Court now to use more specific 
language.”). 
 157. For an explanation of general permits, see infra notes 223–25 and accompanying text. 
 158. County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1477.  The Court also notes that the EPA and the states 
can mitigate harms that arise from additional permitting by “developing general permits for 
recurring situations or by issuing permits based on best practices where appropriate.” Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See generally id. 
 161. Id. at 1470. 
 162. Id. at 1471–72.  Justice Breyer also referenced Representative Aspin’s failed 
amendment in the Act’s legislative history, suggesting that it shows Congress did not intend 
to give the federal government full authority to regulate groundwater as a category of 
jurisdictional waters. Id. at 1472. 
 163. Id. at 1473. 
 164. Id. at 1474. 
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ever falls under “waters of the United States,”165 and he made no mention of 
the Trump administration’s WOTUS Rule, issued just two days before the 
Court’s decision,166 or the Obama-era Clean Water Rule.167 
Justice Breyer described the EPA’s “longstanding regulatory practice” of 
applying the CWA’s permitting provisions to point source discharges that are 
conveyed through groundwater to traditionally navigable waters.168  Yet, he 
noted that the agency has refused to exercise authority over discharges that 
reach groundwater only after lengthy periods, reflecting a narrower 
interpretation than the Ninth Circuit’s “fairly traceable” test.169 
Justice Breyer also rejected the position that the EPA took up before the 
Court and in its 2019 interpretive statement,170 reasoning that the position 
could not be reconciled with the statute’s structure, purposes, or text.171  
“[T]o follow EPA’s reading would open a loophole allowing easy evasion of 
the statutory provision’s basic purposes.  Such an interpretation is neither 
persuasive nor reasonable.”172 
In a concurrence, Justice Kavanaugh stated that the Court’s opinion 
adheres to Justice Scalia’s interpretation of “from any point source” in his 
Rapanos plurality opinion.173  Justice Kavanaugh cited Justice Scalia’s 
reasoning that “polluters could not ‘evade the permitting requirement of 
§ 1342(a) simply by discharging their pollutants into noncovered intermittent 
watercourses that lie upstream of covered waters.’”174  Justice Kavanaugh 
also defended any vagueness in the functional equivalent standard, 
emphasizing that it is a product of the statute’s imprecise statutory text.175 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, dissented to say that the 
majority’s standard departs from both the statutory text176 and Congress’s 
intent to reserve responsibility to regulate non–point sources of pollution, 
like groundwater, to the states.177  Justice Thomas also criticized the Court 
for failing to provide adequate guidance in its explanation of the factors 
relevant to a functional equivalent determination.178 
 
 165. Cf. supra notes 117, 121 and accompanying text (explaining that the Fourth Circuit 
and Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that they were not deciding whether groundwater itself can 
be considered “navigable waters” under the CWA). 
 166. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 168. County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1472 (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 
832 (7th Cir. 1977)). 
 169. Id. (citing McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v. Cheney, 763 F. Supp. 
431, 437 (E.D. Cal. 1989)). 
 170. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. 
 171. County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1475. 
 172. Id. at 1474. 
 173. Id. at 1478 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 174. Id. (quoting Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742–43 (2006)). 
 175. See id. 
 176. Id. at 1479 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Based on the statutory text and structure, I would 
hold that a permit is required only when a point source discharges pollutants directly into 
navigable waters.”). 
 177. Id. at 1480. 
 178. See id. at 1481. 
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In a separate dissent, Justice Alito rebuked the Court for not providing 
clear guidance for the regulated community, permitting agencies, and lower 
courts.179  He wrote that the majority “adopts a nebulous standard, 
enumerates a non-exhaustive list of potentially relevant factors, and washes 
its hands of the problem.”180  According to Justice Alito, the best 
interpretation of the statute is that it requires a permit only when pollutants 
are discharged directly from a point source to navigable waters.181  He 
reasoned that this interpretation would not lead to “the sort of extreme 
consequences that the Court finds unacceptable,” because “point source” is 
defined broadly in the statute to include land features such as ditches and 
channels.182 
II.  UNCERTAINTY AFTER COUNTY OF MAUI 
This part identifies two problems that emerge from the majority and 
concurring opinions in County of Maui.  First, the meaning of functional 
equivalent and the range of scenarios that will meet the Court’s standard are 
unclear.183  This uncertainty may lead to inconsistent applications of the 
functional equivalent standard in lower courts, generating confusion for 
owners of facilities that discharge into groundwater and for groups seeking 
to enforce the CWA against polluting entities.184  Second, and less obviously, 
the Court did not clearly frame its standard as a version of the conduit theory 
or the navigable waters theory.185  While the functional equivalent test seems 
to align more with the conduit theory, there is some latent ambiguity.186  The 
EPA, the Corps, and lower courts are left to navigate this uncertainty and 
perhaps clarify how County of Maui fits within the full context of the CWA 
regulatory landscape. 
A.  A Murky Test 
While County of Maui was celebrated as a win for environmentalists,187 
just how far the CWA’s protections reach remains unclear.  The Court 
outlined seven factors to consider in determining whether a discharge 
through groundwater is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge from 
a point source into navigable waters, but it only specified how two of the 
factors should be weighed.188  It also provided two examples to illustrate how 
 
 179. See id. at 1483 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 180. Id. at 1491. 
 181. Id. at 1486. 
 182. See id. at 1486–87. 
 183. See infra Part II.A. 
 184. See infra Part II.A. 
 185. See infra Part II.B. 
 186. See infra Part II.B. 
 187. See Richard Frank, Here Today, Gone to Maui, LEGAL PLANET (Apr. 25, 2020), 
https://legal-planet.org/2020/04/25/here-today-gone-to-maui/ [https://perma.cc/9HTV-
WK9R]; Jessica A. Knoblauch & Maggie Caldwell, The Clean Water Case of the Century, 
EARTHJUSTICE (Apr. 23, 2020), https://earthjustice.org/features/supreme-court-maui-clean-
water-case [https://perma.cc/3YP5-LSEQ]. 
 188. See County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1476–77 (2020). 
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the test should be applied.189  However, these illustrations do little to clarify 
the test, as they only explain what the outcome should be in the most extreme 
cases.190  Even then, the Court only went so far as to say that a permit is 
“likely” not required if a point source releases a discharge fifty miles and 
“many years” away from navigable waters.191  Moreover, the majority did 
not provide clear guidance regarding how lower courts should balance the 
CWA’s objectives of protecting water quality and preserving states’ 
traditional authority to regulate groundwater pollution.192  While it 
emphasized the importance of both goals, the Court did not advise how each 
should be weighed.193 
Justice Breyer was the first to acknowledge that the majority’s functional 
equivalent test does not provide particularly helpful guidance on how to deal 
with “middle instances,”194 and he passed off the job of clarifying the test to 
the EPA and the lower courts.195  Justice Kavanaugh also admitted that the 
standard is less than clear,196 and Justice Alito sharply criticized the majority 
for failing to give the regulated community and other stakeholders adequate 
guidance.197  Industry critics have echoed this sentiment, lamenting the lack 
of a bright-line rule for industries that discharge any type of water pollution 
into groundwater.198 
The EPA issued a guidance memorandum on January 14, 2021, to provide 
guidance to regulated entities and permitting agencies on applying County of 
Maui in the NPDES permitting context.199  In the guidance, the EPA 
identified an additional factor that the agency said should be considered in a 
functional equivalent analysis:  “the design and performance of the system 
or facility from which the pollutant is released.”200  The addition of this factor 
represents a narrow interpretation of the functional equivalent test, since the 
EPA suggests that the test likely will not be met where a facility treats or 
abates its pollutant discharges before they enter groundwater.201  However, 
 
 189. See id. at 1476. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 194. See County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1476. 
 195. See id. at 1477. 
 196. See id. at 1478 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 197. See id. at 1483 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 198. See, e.g., Gilmer & Saiyid, supra note 21. 
 199. Guidance Memorandum from Anna Wildeman, Acting Assistant Adm’r, U.S. Env’t 
Prot. Agency, on Applying the Supreme Court’s County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund 
Decision in the Clean Water Act Section 402 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System Permit Program (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2021-
01/documents/final_ow_maui_guidance_document_-_signed_1.14.21.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/82HW-MY9C]. 
 200. Id. at 7. 
 201. See id. at 8.  A number of states and environmental groups criticized the guidance in 
its draft form. See State Energy & Env’t Impact Ctr, Twelve AGs Filed Comments Criticizing 
EPA Guidance on Implementation of Supreme Court’s Maui Clean Water Act Decision, NYU 
SCH. OF L. (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/state-impact/ag-actions/twelve-
ags-filed-comments-criticizing-epa-guidance-implementation [https://perma.cc/K2UX-
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the future of the guidance under President Joe Biden’s administration is 
uncertain.202  While lower courts have begun to review cases that were put 
on hold pending the outcome of County of Maui,203 consensus on how the 
functional equivalent test should be applied likely will not develop for some 
time, given the fact-sensitive, case-specific nature of the test.  How broadly 
courts and federal agencies construe the standard is important, because it will 
affect the level of enforcement that dischargers face and the range of legal 
options available to citizen groups seeking to sue polluting facilities. 
1.  Potential Consequences for NPDES Enforcement 
Where an owner or operator of a point source that discharges pollutants 
(excluding fill and dredged material) into jurisdictional waters is in violation 
of § 301(a), they may be subject to strict liability civil penalties,204 
administrative penalties,205 and an order to bring them into compliance under 
the NPDES permitting scheme.206  This includes unpermitted owners and 
operators, as well as owners and operators who have an NPDES permit for 
their facilities but who nonetheless engage in unauthorized discharge or who 
violate the terms of their permits.207  Violators may also be subject to 
criminal penalties.208  Civil penalties can reach up to $55,800 per day,209 
while criminal penalties can range from $2500 to $100,000 per day.210  
“[T]he threat of unlawful discharge and permit violation enforcement cases, 
with their strict liability civil penalties, promotes compliance with Section 
301(a) of the Act.”211 
Under the County of Maui standard, if a point source discharge into 
groundwater is found to be the functional equivalent of a direct discharge 
into jurisdictional waters and it falls under the NPDES permitting scheme, 
the main practical consequence is that the owner or operator of that point 
source will be required to obtain a permit from the EPA containing effluent 
 
9N4K]; Hannah Northey & Pamela King, Leaked Draft:  EPA Aims to Clarify Supreme Court 
Maui Ruling, E&E NEWS (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063719841 
[https://perma.cc/FW9J-W5A7]. 
 202. See Northey & King, supra note 201. 
 203. See, e.g., Conservation L. Found., Inc. v. Longwood Venues & Destinations, Inc., No. 
20-1024, 2020 WL 6111192, at *1 (1st Cir. Oct. 14, 2020); Prairie Rivers Network v. Dynegy 
Midwest Generation, LLC, 976 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2020). 
 204. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (“Any person who violates section 301 . . . of this Act . . . or any 
permit condition or limitation . . . in a permit issued under section 402 of this Act . . . shall be 
subject to a civil penalty . . . .”). 
 205. Id. § 1319(g). 
 206. Id. § 1319(a). 
 207. See id.; David Drelich, Restoring the Cornerstone of the Clean Water Act, 34 COLUM. 
J. ENV’T L. 267, 321 (2009). 
 208. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c). 
 209. Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustment Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 1751, 1754 (proposed 
Jan. 13, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 19). 
 210. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c); see also Criminal Provisions of Water Pollution, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/criminal-provisions-water-pollution [https://perma.cc/ 
Y3J8-KYCU] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021). 
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limitations and requirements for water monitoring and reporting.212  The 
permit will require the owner or operator to implement mandated technology 
applicable to the category of industry to which the facility belongs in order 
to meet the permit’s effluent limitations.213  While it is possible that 
dischargers will be required to stop activity,214 injunctive relief is not 
commonly available.215  Dischargers will also be subject to any civil or 
criminal penalties assessed against them.216  While these consequences 
represent some costs, they are generally not so burdensome as to be project 
prohibitive for the average discharger.217 
If the functional equivalent standard is narrowly construed such that a 
permit is only required when pollutants travel briefly and for a short distance 
through groundwater, citizen groups seeking enforcement against entities 
that send discharges into groundwater would have to turn more frequently to 
state regulatory programs.218  Where there is no state enforcement 
mechanism for groundwater discharges,219 these groups will be out of luck 
unless another federal statute applies, such as the SDWA or RCRA.  This 
would make it much more difficult for nongovernmental stakeholders to 
secure desired remedies against polluters using the CWA’s citizen suit 
provision.220 
On the other hand, if courts find that the functional equivalent standard is 
met in a wide range of scenarios, citizen groups will have more options for 
suing over groundwater pollution.221  However, even with a broadly 
applicable test, the scope of liability for those who violate § 301(a) is still 
uncertain to some extent.  The majority in County of Maui explained that 
judges can “mitigate any hardship or injustice when they apply the statute’s 
penalty provision” and should “exercise their discretion mindful . . . of the 
complexities inherent to the context of indirect discharges through 
 
 212. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a); see also NPDES Permit Basics, supra note 35. 
 213. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b), 1317, 1342(a). 
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55, 59 (citing Frank S. Hollerman III, S. Env’t L. Ctr., Comment on Clean Water Act Coverage 
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18, 2018), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0063-0066 [https:// 
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 219. State regulation of discharges into groundwater varies significantly. See THOMSON 
REUTERS, supra note 105.  Some states regulate groundwater discharges as part of their 
administration of the NPDES program, while others regulate such discharges under state laws, 
see Blumm & Thiel, supra note 9, at 341, which may or may not contain a citizen suit 
provision. 
 220. See Bittner et al., supra note 218, at 59. 
 221. See supra note 13. 
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groundwater, so as to calibrate the Act’s penalties when, for example, a party 
could reasonably have thought that a permit was not required.”222  Depending 
on how lower courts heed the majority’s advice, many dischargers may be 
newly subject to NPDES permitting requirements while free from significant 
financial consequences beyond the cost of implementing technology.  In 
other words, the current law could result in a broadly applicable test that has 
limited bite. 
Further, the EPA has the authority to issue general permits, which, like 
individual NPDES permits, may contain enforceable effluent limitations.223  
However, general permits are issued for particular categories of activities and 
may apply to a variety of point sources discharging into different waters.224  
Dischargers seeking coverage under general permits are typically required to 
submit only a notice of intent to their permitting agencies, providing 
information about the planned discharge and expressing their intent to be 
covered under a general permit.225  While the adequacy of the general permit 
program to protect water quality and implement the objectives of the CWA 
has been subject to criticism,226 the Court in County of Maui encouraged the 
EPA to promulgate such permits as a way of guiding the application of the 
functional equivalent standard.227  If the functional equivalent test is 
interpreted broadly by courts, perhaps the EPA will be more likely to create 
general permits as a way of accommodating the potentially numerous 
dischargers that may become subject to the NPDES permitting program.  The 
generic nature of these permits is less than ideal from an environmentally 
protective standpoint,228 but general permits at least require some degree of 
pollution mitigation and compliance with effluent standards.229  Moreover, a 
general permit is subject to review every five years,230 so it would guarantee 
more water resource protection than would no permit at all. 
2.  Potential Consequences for § 404 Enforcement 
Although it is not entirely clear to what extent, if at all, the functional 
equivalent test applies in the § 404 permitting context,231 it is worth 
 
 222. County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1477 (2020). 
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 224. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.28; Gaba, supra note 223, at 411. 
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 228. See supra note 226. 
 229. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a)(3). 
 230. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(B). 
 231. As mentioned in Part I.C, the majority in County of Maui did not specify whether the 
test ever applies to discharges of fill or dredged material that come under the § 404 permitting 
program. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.  Perhaps the Court failed to appreciate 
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exploring what the ramifications would be.  Under the § 404 permitting 
program, a permit from the Corps is required for the discharge of fill or 
dredged material into jurisdictional waters, including some wetlands.232  The 
statute authorizes the EPA, after consulting with the Corps, to deny permits 
where the discharge would have an “unacceptable adverse effect on 
municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including 
spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas.”233  
Additionally, the implementing regulations require that there be no 
“practicable alternative” to the proposed discharge in order for a permit to be 
granted.234  This provision represents a much higher standard than that under 
the NPDES permitting scheme, which has no such requirement.  Thus, if 
discharges of fill or dredged material meet the functional equivalent standard, 
the practical consequences for the discharger may be much greater, since it 
is more likely that an activity may be prohibited altogether.  With regard to 
civil and criminal penalties, the same provisions apply to both § 402 and 
§ 404 permit violators.235 
If the functional equivalent test is narrowly construed by courts, it may not 
cover many § 404 discharges due to the nature of fill and dredged material.236  
However, if the test is interpreted to encompass a broad range of scenarios, 
it may have a substantial limiting effect on activity covered by § 404, 
including filling wetlands.  Dischargers that have released fill or dredged 
material prior to applying for a permit could also face civil and even criminal 
penalties,237 although the size of these penalties is subject to judicial 
discretion.238 
B.  The Navigable Waters Theory:  Still on the Table? 
The uncertainty created by County of Maui is also partly a product of the 
Court’s failure to clearly frame its holding in relation to the navigable waters 
theory.  Under the functional equivalent test, discharges from a point source 
through groundwater may be subject to the CWA’s permitting scheme if they 
ultimately reach navigable waters.239  The standard can certainly be viewed 
as a recognition that regulating point source pollution to jurisdictional surface 
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 239. See County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1468 (2020). 
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waters necessarily entails regulating some discharges that first pass through 
groundwater, consistent with the conduit theory.240  However, the decision 
may also be interpreted—and has been interpreted by a number of 
commentators241—as an acknowledgment that, in some but not all cases, 
groundwater comes under the EPA and the Corps’s authority to regulate 
“waters of the United States.”242 
Whether the Court opened the door to a navigable waters theory of 
groundwater regulation is ambiguous in the opinion’s text.  Justice Breyer 
did not discuss how the Court’s holding relates to the line of cases 
interpreting “waters of the United States,” other than to mention a comment 
from Justice Scalia’s plurality in Rapanos regarding how the word “from” 
should be interpreted.243  Justice Breyer did not need to address those cases 
since they focused specifically on whether certain wetlands were “waters of 
the United States,” a different question about the scope of CWA 
jurisdiction.244  Nevertheless, the fractured Rapanos decision has particular 
relevance for groundwater, since Justice Kennedy’s concurrence can be read 
as compatible with the navigable waters theory.245  Additionally, unlike some 
lower courts,246 Justice Breyer did not explicitly say that County of Maui 
does not address the question of whether groundwater can be considered 
“waters of the United States.”  Moreover, Justice Breyer did not address 
whether the decision has implications for the federal agencies’ categorical 
exclusion of groundwater from their definition of “waters of the United 
States.”247  Consequently, it is unclear how County of Maui relates to 
Rapanos and the WOTUS Rule. 
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Unlike the majority, Justice Kavanaugh did address the decision’s 
relationship to Rapanos in his concurrence.248  Because Justice Kavanaugh 
believed the County of Maui holding accords with Justice Scalia’s plurality 
opinion in Rapanos,249 it would seem that he viewed groundwater as merely 
a conduit and never a jurisdictional water under the CWA.250  Further, the 
current WOTUS Rule was based on Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion.251  
Perhaps this indicates that Justice Kavanaugh would understand County of 
Maui to be compatible with the WOTUS Rule and its categorical exclusion 
of groundwater.  However, Justice Kavanaugh wrote only for himself, so his 
concurrence does not clearly resolve the latent ambiguity left by the 
majority’s decision.  With no other words on the matter from the Court, 
Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion could signal that a challenge to the WOTUS 
Rule’s exclusion of groundwater would likely not succeed. 
This uncertainty has practical implications.  If County of Maui is 
understood as saying that some groundwater can be regulated as “waters of 
the United States” on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the navigable 
waters theory, the decision would directly conflict with the position the 
Trump administration staked out in its WOTUS Rule.252  Some practitioners 
and commentators have already characterized the decision this way.253  
States and citizen groups challenging the WOTUS Rule in court254 could 
argue that the agencies’ categorical exclusion of groundwater from the 
“waters of the United States” definition is untenable after County of Maui.  
They might call for the inclusion of groundwater in a middle, case-specific 
category similar to the case-specific significant nexus category established in 
the Clean Water Rule.255  Creation of such a category would begin a new 
chapter—focused on groundwater rather than wetlands—in the decades-long 
“waters of the United States” saga.256  Litigation would surely ensue, since 
extending jurisdictional status over groundwater would implicate the 
federalism concerns that have driven much of the past disagreement over the 
scope of the CWA.257  Federal agencies, wishing to avoid arguments that 
they are frustrating Congress’s intent to preserve states’ traditional authority 
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to regulate groundwater and non–point source pollution,258 may be reluctant 
to assert jurisdiction over groundwater in such an explicit way. 
On the other hand, if County of Maui is understood as saying that 
groundwater functions only as a conduit and is never a jurisdictional water, 
the decision may be compatible with the WOTUS Rule.  Excluding 
groundwater from the definition of “waters of the United States” does not 
necessarily preclude the regulation of discharges through groundwater into 
waters that are deemed to be “waters of the United States.”259  This framing 
would make the success of any legal challenges to the WOTUS Rule’s 
exclusion of groundwater much less likely. 
For the moment, it remains unclear whether County of Maui and the 
WOTUS Rule are in conflict.  Perhaps this ambiguity was intentional, and 
the Court wished to leave it as an open question for the agencies and lower 
courts, or perhaps the Court simply did not articulate its intended framing 
clearly.  Perhaps it is the latter, given that Justice Breyer referenced the 
decades of EPA practice applying the CWA’s permitting provisions to 
groundwater discharges that reach navigable waters and implied that the 
Court’s standard is narrower.260  Regardless, if left unresolved, confusion 
over the scope of federal protections for water resources will remain. 
III.  A SIGNIFICANT NEXUS OVERLAY TO BRING COUNTY OF MAUI INTO 
FOCUS 
The latent ambiguity of the County of Maui decision and the fact-specific 
nature of the functional equivalent test leave lower courts and permitting 
agencies with an unenviable task.  The ways in which they frame the Court’s 
holding and begin to define the test’s boundaries will shape the next chapter 
of discourse regarding “waters of the United States” and how groundwater 
discharges are regulated.261  More saliently, these decisions will have 
significant implications for regulated entities seeking to understand liability 
risks and environmental groups weighing the costs and benefits of pursuing 
citizen suits under the CWA.262  The future of the test will also affect the 
health of the nation’s water resources and the ecosystems, communities, and 
economies that depend on them. 
This part proposes that the significant nexus test articulated in Justice 
Kennedy’s Rapanos concurrence263 can offer guidance to lower courts 
applying the County of Maui standard.  As discussed above, Justice Breyer 
did not provide instructions about how to weigh the seven factors that he said 
may be relevant to a functional equivalent determination, beyond prioritizing 
time and distance.264  Further, his instructions for considering the CWA’s 
 
 258. See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text. 
 259. See supra notes 249–51 and accompanying text. 
 260. See County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1472–73 (2020). 
 261. See supra Part II.B. 
 262. See supra Part II.A. 
 263. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 780 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 264. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
2800 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
policy objectives in a functional equivalent analysis are ambiguous.265  
Consequently, when a court encounters a case where the seven factors point 
in different directions, County of Maui offers no clear answer about whether 
the discharge meets the functional equivalent standard.  The court will be left 
to do its own balancing of the Act’s broad goal of protecting the nation’s 
water resources through federal regulation and Congress’s intent to preserve 
state authority over groundwater pollution. 
Overlaying Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus standard on the functional 
equivalent test in such cases would help courts strike the correct balance.  
Under this approach, a court would ask whether the discharge that is arriving 
to surface waters after passing through groundwater “significantly affect[s] 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of the receiving waters.266  
If the answer is yes, the court should conclude that the County of Maui test 
is satisfied:  the discharge is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge 
into navigable waters.  By focusing the inquiry on the discharge’s effects on 
the integrity of navigable waters, it would ensure that courts do not stray from 
the Act’s overarching objective of restoring and maintaining the integrity of 
the nation’s waters.267 
To understand the potential utility of a significant nexus overlay approach, 
it is helpful to first compare the functional equivalent test and Justice 
Kennedy’s significant nexus test.  Part III.A highlights the differences and 
similarities between the two standards and the opinions from which they are 
drawn.  Part III.B then discusses the advantages and possible pitfalls of an 
overlay approach, briefly touching on how the approach may resolve some 
of the tension generated by the Court’s failure to address whether 
groundwater ever constitutes “waters of the United States.”  Finally, Part 
III.C considers some alternative approaches to applying the functional 
equivalent test and argues that the overlay approach is both more practical 
for all parties involved and more consistent with the CWA’s purpose of 
protecting the nation’s water resources. 
A.  Comparing the Significant Nexus and Functional Equivalent Standards 
It is important to start by noting the different physical circumstances that 
the significant nexus test and functional equivalent test were designed to 
address.  In Rapanos, the Court was asked to decide whether development 
activity that involved filling wetlands should be subject to § 404 permitting 
requirements because the wetlands were “waters of the United States.”268  
Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus standard aimed to require a permit where 
wetlands—and therefore, any filling activity in those wetlands—significantly 
impacted the health of hydrologically connected navigable waters.269  On the 
other hand, in County of Maui, the Court was concerned with discharges of 
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chemical pollution into groundwater, where the discharger knew that the 
effluent would end up in the Pacific Ocean.270  The Court held that such 
discharges, if found to be the functional equivalent of direct discharges into 
the ocean, would be subject to NPDES permitting requirements.271  The two 
physical scenarios are distinguished by the nature of the discharge272 and the 
type of water into which it is directly discharged.  The two legal standards 
differ in which statutory term—“waters of the United States” and “from any 
point source”—they seek to define. 
Despite these differences, Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test 
embodies many of the same goals as the functional equivalent test.  Justice 
Kennedy called for CWA regulation of wetlands where wetlands “either 
alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, 
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of 
traditionally navigable waters.273  He indicated that the quantity and 
regularity of water flow in the tributaries connecting a wetland to 
traditionally navigable waters may be important factors in a significant nexus 
analysis.274  Justice Breyer similarly emphasized that CWA jurisdiction over 
discharges through groundwater is dependent on a variety of hydrological 
factors, including time, distance, and the nature of the material through which 
the pollution travels.275  Both opinions acknowledged the interconnectivity 
of water features and demonstrate an understanding of hydrological 
principles.276  They recognized that the characteristics of tributaries and 
groundwater systems may vary, thus affecting the ways in which pollutants 
are conveyed between point sources and surface waters. 
Further, under both tests, the existence of a hydrological connection 
between the water directly receiving the discharge from a point source and 
navigable waters is necessary but not sufficient for CWA coverage.  For 
Justice Kennedy, CWA jurisdiction attaches only when wetlands 
“significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of 
navigable waters.277  He also noted that if a wetland’s effects on downstream 
water quality are “speculative or insubstantial,” it cannot be considered 
within “waters of the United States.”278  In County of Maui, Justice Breyer 
raised similar kinds of concerns in his rejection of the Ninth Circuit’s “fairly 
traceable” standard,279 although his focus on downstream effects is less 
explicit.  According to Justice Breyer, the “fairly traceable” standard would 
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allow for federal regulation of discharges that only reach traditionally 
navigable waters “in highly diluted forms” and “many years after their 
release.”280  His reasoning suggests that CWA regulation is appropriate only 
where upstream water pollution has at least a relatively substantial impact on 
downstream navigable waters.  The language of the functional equivalent test 
itself also reflects a concern with the effects that discharges have on 
navigable waters.281 
Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer also both recognized the need to 
balance the CWA’s purpose of protecting the nation’s waters and its policy 
of preserving states’ traditional regulatory authority over groundwater 
pollution,282 but only Justice Kennedy clearly explained how his standard 
does so.  Justice Kennedy indicated that the significant nexus determination 
should be guided by Congress’s goal of “restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”283  He 
acknowledged that his test does not fit neatly within the traditional zone of 
federal authority but states that it “does not raise federalism . . . concerns 
sufficient to support a presumption against its adoption.”284  Criticizing the 
Rapanos plurality’s standard, he contends that requiring permanent or 
continuously flowing water, as the plurality does, is impractical in light of 
the statute’s goal of protecting downstream water quality.285 
It is less clear where Justice Breyer struck the balance, but he did express 
an unwillingness to allow the CWA’s commitment to preserving states’ 
traditional regulatory authority to undermine the statute’s main goal of 
protecting the integrity of jurisdictional waters.  He rejected the EPA’s 
position that discharges through groundwater are never subject to CWA 
permitting requirements, reasoning that it would allow easy evasion of the 
statute’s basic federal regulatory objectives.286  Further, he stated that 
“Congress did not require a permit for all discharges to groundwater . . . .  
But there is quite a gap between ‘not all’ and ‘none.’”287  Similar to Justice 
Kennedy in Rapanos, Justice Breyer seemed to suggest that preserving the 
Act’s cooperative federalism framework does not require a total absence of 
federal oversight over water pollution that was traditionally left to the states 
to regulate. 
Despite the fact that they were articulated in response to different physical 
conditions and slightly different jurisdictional questions, the significant 
nexus and functional equivalent tests seem to approach CWA jurisdiction in 
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parallel ways.  Their similarities support the use of Justice Kennedy’s test to 
illuminate Justice Breyer’s, particularly where Justice Breyer’s test lacks 
shape. 
B.  Evaluating the Utility of an Overlay Approach 
While not a perfect solution to a vague test, a significant nexus overlay 
approach has benefits.  It would help prevent lower courts from applying the 
functional equivalent test more narrowly than the County of Maui Court 
intended.288  It would also create consistency for courts and regulated 
entities, which is particularly important in light of the uncertain future of the 
WOTUS Rule under a new presidential administration.289  Finally, it offers 
a practical way of ensuring that lower court decisions do not disturb the 
CWA’s cooperative federalism framework.290 
1.  Alignment with County of Maui 
Overlaying Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test on the functional 
equivalent test would help ensure that the latter is not applied too narrowly.  
If the functional equivalent test is found to be satisfied only where Justice 
Breyer’s seven factors clearly indicate that the groundwater discharge is the 
functional equivalent of a direct discharge—for instance, where transit time 
is short and distance traveled is small—it would only prevent the creation of 
“large and obvious loophole[s]” in the Act.291  The Court certainly meant to 
do more when it instructed lower courts to avoid “serious risks . . . of creating 
loopholes that undermine the statute’s basic federal regulatory objectives.”292  
Justice Breyer further suggested that a narrow application was not intended 
through his illustration of how the factors operate in extreme scenarios.293  
Justice Breyer stated that where a pipe releases pollutants into groundwater 
fifty miles from navigable waters, and the pollutants mix with “much other 
material” and only reach the navigable waters “many years later,” the Act’s 
permitting requirements “likely do not apply.”294  His use of “likely” 
indicates that the Court did not necessarily expect a discharge to look exactly 
the same at the time it arrives to navigable waters as it did when it left the 
point source.  It allows for the possibility that Justice Breyer’s factors might 
point in different directions, or even lean toward a “no” finding, yet the 
functional equivalent standard could still be met if the pollutants seriously 
harmed the downstream navigable waters.  A significant nexus overlay 
accounts for this complexity by focusing a court’s attention on the impacts 
of a discharge. 
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By preventing courts from applying the functional equivalent test too 
narrowly, the overlay approach would preserve opportunities for 
nongovernmental stakeholders to seek enforcement measures against 
groundwater polluters using the CWA’s citizen suit provision.295  This would 
provide important consistency in the context of a patchwork of state 
regulation.296 
2.  Consistency for Courts and Regulated Entities 
The overlay approach would also promote consistency in the way that 
lower courts around the country apply the functional equivalent test.  Since 
Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus standard more explicitly asks about 
effects on navigable waters, overlaying that standard on the functional 
equivalent test in cases where the County of Maui factors do not point in a 
clear direction helps sharpen the analysis.  If courts ask whether a given 
groundwater discharge “significantly affect[s] the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity”297 of navigable waters, they will have a more 
straightforward way to make determinations in what the County of Maui 
Court calls “middle instances.”298  As a result, determinations under the 
functional equivalent test will be more consistent across jurisdictions, giving 
regulated entities greater predictability. 
Predictability for regulated entities is especially important given that the 
scope of “waters of the United States” remains unsettled.299  The fractured 
Rapanos decision provided no clear controlling standard for determining 
which waters are jurisdictional,300 and the Trump administration’s WOTUS 
Rule faces an uncertain future due to litigation301 and a new 
administration.302  Moreover, County of Maui generated confusion about 
whether its holding stands in conflict with the agencies’ categorical exclusion 
of groundwater from “waters of the United States.”303  The significant nexus 
overlay approach is useful here.  Its application likely provides the same or 
similar protection for groundwater and surface waters that would be provided 
under a navigable waters theory—where groundwater is considered 
jurisdictional if it shares a significant nexus with traditionally navigable 
waters.304  In other words, the group of dischargers subject to CWA 
permitting requirements under the overlay approach would be unlikely to 
differ significantly from the group of dischargers subject to permitting 
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because of a broader “waters of the United States” definition.  Therefore, if 
the EPA and the Corps were to replace the WOTUS Rule with a rule that no 
longer categorically excludes groundwater from “waters of the United 
States,” dischargers would not experience much of a practical difference at 
the permitting level. 
3.  No Disruption to the Cooperative Federalism Framework 
The County of Maui majority recognized that Congress intended to 
preserve state regulation of groundwater and other non–point sources of 
pollution in the CWA,305 emphasizing that courts should not jeopardize this 
goal in making “functional equivalent” determinations.306  A “significant 
nexus” overlay approach accounts for this concern. 
The overlay approach protects against intrusions on state regulation of 
groundwater by requiring a permit only where (1) Justice Breyer’s factors do 
not clearly point toward a “no functional equivalence” finding, and (2) 
pollution from a point source significantly affects the water quality of surface 
water bodies.  Because the focus is on the impact of point source pollution 
on surface waters, not groundwater, the approach does not impinge on states’ 
ability to regulate groundwater and non–point source pollution.  Although it 
embodies a relatively broad approach to applying the functional equivalent 
test, the overlay approach is still narrower than the Ninth Circuit’s fairly 
traceable test,307 which the Court rejected in County of Maui because it would 
interfere with states’ traditional regulatory authority.308  Unlike the fairly 
traceable test, the overlay approach requires more than mere evidence that 
pollutants are traceable from a point source to surface waters via groundwater 
and, again, the focus is on whether jurisdictional surface waters are 
significantly impacted. 
One alternative approach to ensuring that functional equivalent 
determinations do not undermine states’ traditional regulatory authority 
emerges in the scholarship discussing County of Maui.309  It involves 
applying the CWA’s objective of preserving states’ traditional regulatory 
authority as a guardrail after considering the functional equivalent factors.310  
The approach proposes that, where a discharge appears to satisfy the 
functional equivalent standard, “a court should not impose liability if federal 
regulation of the class of such discharges would upset the Act’s federal-state 
balance.”311  It is suggested that imposing liability in such a situation would 
be acceptable only if a failure to do so “would incentivize law evasion 
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through the reconfiguring of otherwise regulated direct discharges.”312  But 
the County of Maui Court did not go quite so far when it called for courts to 
avoid creating loopholes in the statute.313  A loophole in the CWA’s basic 
purpose of protecting surface waters through federal regulation could exist 
even where existing dischargers are not likely to change their behavior to 
take advantage of such a loophole.  Moreover, a theoretical inquiry into the 
likelihood that dischargers would reconfigure their point sources to avoid 
federal regulation may not always be practical or easy for courts.  It also may 
not be clear to courts if a “yes” determination under the functional equivalent 
standard would undermine the CWA’s cooperative federalism framework. 
A significant nexus overlay approach is preferable because it does the 
work of balancing the Act’s statutory objectives.  It would ensure that the 
CWA’s cooperative federalism framework is preserved by finding CWA 
jurisdiction only where a point source discharge significantly affects the 
integrity of jurisdictional surface waters.314  It would also avoid the problem 
of courts needing to determine whether imposing liability would “upset the 
federal-state balance,”315 a task that would likely only exacerbate any 
inconsistencies among courts applying the County of Maui standard. 
Another approach courts might consider to avoid intruding on state 
regulatory authority is to ask whether the groundwater discharge at issue is 
already regulated by a state statute.  If it is not subject to state regulation and 
at least some of the factors tend to satisfy the functional equivalent standard, 
a court could conclude that federal regulation is warranted.  However, such 
an approach would not balance the CWA’s objectives as Congress or the 
Court intended.316  Congress’s goal was to preserve the traditional authority 
of state governments to decide whether and how to regulate groundwater and 
non–point source pollution,317 not for the federal government to step in 
where states failed to regulate groundwater pollution in a certain way.  
Further, focusing on the existence of state groundwater regulations is 
impractical, as state policy may change over time.  Applying a significant 
nexus analysis to groundwater discharges in instances where the functional 
equivalent test offers limited guidance is preferable, because it is practical 
and ensures that neither of the CWA’s objectives is seriously disturbed. 
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4.  Limitations of a Significant Nexus Overlay Approach 
The significant nexus overlay approach has limitations, too.  Just like the 
functional equivalent test, Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus standard 
carries some ambiguity and operates on a case-by-case basis,318 which may 
present new line-drawing difficulties for courts.  It is also only espoused in 
one concurrence.319 
Although the significant nexus overlay approach does not supply a bright-
line rule in difficult cases, it does offer a focused question that does the work 
of balancing the Act’s objectives.320  The fact that Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence was not joined by other Justices does not reduce its utility in the 
groundwater discharge context, especially given the similarities between 
Justice Kennedy’s and Justice Breyer’s reasoning.321  Further, lower courts 
are already familiar with Justice Kennedy’s test since it has been treated by 
many as the controlling opinion in Rapanos.322  While Justice Breyer did not 
mention Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test, one possible explanation is 
that he did not want to give the impression that the Court was resolving 
Rapanos by endorsing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. 
Despite some potential pitfalls, a significant nexus overlay approach still 
offers practical utility to courts, the regulated community, and groups relying 
on the CWA’s citizen suit provision.  County of Maui contains minimal 
guidance for courts navigating difficult applications of the functional 
equivalent test, and the overlay approach provides a workable solution for 
situations where Justice Breyer’s seven factors do not clearly point in one 
direction.  If courts employ the approach, the CWA will be more promising 
for citizen groups seeking stronger groundwater protections.  Additionally, 
potentially regulated entities will be better able to predict their own liability 
risks. 
CONCLUSION 
In the wake of County of Maui, the fact-specific and somewhat amorphous 
functional equivalent standard may lead to inconsistent applications among 
lower courts.  Further, the Court’s failure to articulate how the decision 
relates, if at all, to the ongoing debate over the scope of “waters of the United 
States” adds to the uncertainty generated by the decision.  Employing a 
significant nexus overlay on the functional equivalent test in difficult cases 
can help illuminate a path forward for lower courts.  This proposed 
framework is both practical to apply and consistent with Congress’s vision 
for aggressive federal regulation of water pollution within a cooperative 
federal-state partnership. 
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